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Assessing the Constitutionality of
Reproductive Technologies Regulation:
A Bioethical Approach
ELYSE WHITNEY GRANT*
Current reproductive technologies have given parents the means to select against
unwanted genetic characteristics by discarding or aborting genetically undesirable
embryos or fetuses. Technologies such as preimplantation genetic screening and
prenatal genetic testing allow parents to test embryos and previable fetuses, respectively,
for genes associated with an array of nontherapeutic and therapeutic characteristics-
from eye color to sex to disease. Because regulation of access to these technologies
seems likely, the Supreme Court will be called upon to address the constitutionality of
these regulations. The Court will face difficult questions about the balance between the
procreative liberty interest in accessing information provided by these technologies and
the potentially conflicting government interest in regulating such access.
This Note articulates the problems with our current procreative liberty jurisprudence
and proposes an alternate framework for balancing individual and States' rights. First,
I argue that precedential case law allows for the construction of a broad procreative
liberty interest in accessing reproductive technological information from both
preimplantation and prenatal genetic tests. Second, to balance procreative liberty and
State interests, I propose the use of an analytical framework based upon Tom
Beauchamp and James Childress's four principles of bioethics: autonomy,
nonmaleficence, beneficence, and distributive justice. My hope is that these four
principles will provide an objective language that the Court can use to articulate its ethical
concerns and to create a more transparent dialogue between the liberty and State interests
at issue. Lastly, I apply the four principles and speculate about the constitutionality of
regulating access to information provided by reproductive technologies.
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 20o0. B.A., Psychology
and American Studies, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2007. I would like to thank my
incredible advisor, Professor Jaime King, for her constant guidance and support, endless energy, and
perpetual willingness to brainstorm with me. Professor King's passion for this subject matter has been
a true inspiration. I would also like to thank my family and my boyfriend for patiently listening to me
recite Supreme Court jurisprudence for hours on end and for always offering constructive opinions.
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INTRODUCTION
Abortion rights supporters-who believe that a woman has the right
to make decisions about her own body-have had to grapple with the
reality that the right to choose may well be used selectively to abort
fetuses deemed genetically undesirable. And many are finding that,
while they support a woman's right to have an abortion if she does not
want to have a baby, they are less comfortable when abortion is used
by women who don't want to have a particular baby.'
Current reproductive technologies have provided parents with the
means to select against unwanted genetic characteristics by discarding or
aborting genetically undesirable embryos or fetuses. Technologies like
preimplantation genetic screening and prenatal genetic testing allow
parents to test embryos and previable fetuses, respectively, for genes
i. Amy Harmon, Genetic Testing + Abortion = ???, N.Y. TIMEs, May 13, 2007, §4, at i.
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associated with characteristics like sex,2 hair color,3 eye color,4 skin color,5
and height,6  as well as those associated with diseases like
phenylketonuria,' breast cancer,8 Tay-Sachs disease,9 and cystic fibrosis.'0
After the Supreme Court's recent decision to uphold the Partial-Birth
Abortion Ban Act on moral grounds in Gonzales v. Carhart," it seems
likely that states will respond to the moral concerns implicated by these
technologies with government regulation of access to the information
provided by such technologies. 2 These regulations will leave the Court to
face difficult questions about the balance between the procreative liberty
2. Kirstin M. Finning & Lyn S. Chitty, Non-Invasive Fetal Sex Determination: Impact on Clinical
Practice, 13 SEMINARs FETAL & NEONATAL MED. 69, 69-70 (2oo8).
3. Wojciech Branicki et al., Interactions Between HERC2, OCA2 and MCiR May Influence
Human Pigmentation Phenotype, 73 ANNALS Hum. GENETICS I6o, 164-65 (2009).
4. Id. at 164.
5. Id. at 165.
6. Ulla Sovio et al., Genetic Determinants of Height Growth Assessed Longitudinally from
Infancy to Adulthood in the Northern Finland Birth Cohort 1966, PLoS GENETICS, Mar. 2009, at 1, 2.
7. Per Guldberg et al., Phenylalanine Hydroxylase Gene Mutations in the United States: Report
from the Maternal PKU Collaborative Study, 59 AM. J. Hum. GENETICS 84, 88-89 (1996). People with
phenylketonuria lack the enzyme necessary to metabolize phenylalanine. Id. at 84. Accumulation of
phenylalanine can lead to mental retardation and brain damage. Id.
8. M. Sagi et al., Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis for BRCAI/2 -A Novel Clinical Experience,
29 PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS 5o8, 508-12 (2009).
9. Michael M. Kaback, Population-Based Genetic Screening for Reproductive Counseling: The
Tay-Sachs Disease Model, 159 EUR. J. PEDIATRICS S192, S192-93 (2000).
io. Carolyn S. Richards & Wayne W. Grody, Prenatal Screening for Cystic Fibrosis: Past, Present,
and Future, 4 EXPERT REV. MOLECULAR DIAGNOSTICS 49,50 (2004).
11. 550 U.S. 124, 157-58 (2007). Despite prior jurisprudence that disallowed pre-viability
regulation of abortion procedures, see Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 870
(1992) (plurality opinion), the Supreme Court in Gonzales held that previability regulation of intact
dilation and extraction abortion procedures was permissible because the procedure "implicates
additional ethical and moral concerns that justify a special prohibition." 505 U.S. at 158. In other
words, the Supreme Court recognized "morality" as a justification for governmental regulation of
access to a certain previability abortion procedure. Interpreted broadly, the Gonzales decision
epitomized the tug-of-war between government regulation of, and respect for, reproductive rights.
This tug-of-war has been carried over from the abortion context into the area of reproductive
technologies. Parents could thus selectively discard embryos or abort fetuses with genetic makeups not
to their liking.
12. See, e.g., June Carbone, If I Say "Yes" to Regulation Today, Will You Still Respect Me in the
Morning?, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1747, 1749 (2oo8) ("[T]he issue becomes the role of regulation in
setting appropriate norms that are accepted by the public rather than imposed from above."); Marsha
Garrison, Regulating Reproduction, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1623, 1625 (2oo8) ("[S]ome [assisted
reproductive technology] regulation is both constitutionally permissible and desirable."); Jaime King,
Predicting Probability: Regulating the Future of Preimplantation Genetic Screening, 8 YALE J. HEALTH
POL'Y L. & ETIcs 283, 323 (2oo8) ("The government should put in the political infrastructure to
balance the potential benefits to parents of unrestricted use against the probability and severity of the
risks associated with [preimplantation genetic screening]."). Indeed, state legislatures have already
begun to react to the availability of these technologies. For example, the Oklahoma House of
Representatives recently approved a measure prohibiting sex-selective abortions. See Dale Wetzel,
North Dakota House Gives Fertilized Egg Full Rights, HUFFINGTON PosT, Feb. x8, 2009, http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/o2/I8/north-dakota-house-givesjnI67884.html.
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interest in accessing the information provided by these technologies and
the potentially conflicting government interest in regulating such access.
When constitutional challenges to such regulations arise, the Court
must be prepared to articulate the boundaries of the procreative liberty
right at issue. Within its Fourteenth Amendment due process
jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has recognized certain fundamental
rights, including a woman's limited right to have an abortion." In
analyzing government regulation of these rights, the Court considers the
strength of the right at stake as compared to the strength of the
government's interest in regulating that right. The Court's assessment of
these two factors within the area of reproductive rights can be divided
into two prongs: (i) the procreative liberty interest prong, in which the
fundamentality of the right at issue is considered; and (2) the balancing
prong, in which the State's interest is weighed against the liberty interest
articulated in prong one. Under the first prong, the Court has-at least
early in its jurisprudence-broadly construed the procreative liberty
interest in granting women the right to obtain a previability abortion.
The Court reasoned that "[t]hese matters, involving the most intimate
and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to
personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment." 4
Although the Court continues to recognize a broad procreative
liberty interest," it has recently used the second "balancing" prong to
constrain this broad right. In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey, the Court first recognized that "[e]ven in the
earliest stages of pregnancy, the State may enact rules and regulations
designed to encourage [the mother] to know that there are philosophic
and social arguments of great weight that can be brought to bear in favor
of continuing the pregnancy."' 6 In essence, the Court has permitted some
level of governmental interference in reproductive decisionmaking and
has only invalidated state regulation that placed an "undue burden"
upon the exercise of a woman's procreative liberty interest in procuring a
previability abortion, 7 or that "ha[d] the purpose or effect of placing a
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a
13. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 13, 153 (1973).
14. Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
15. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 146 (2007) (quoting Casey. 505 U.S. at 879 (plurality
opinion), for the proposition that the State "may not prohibit any woman from making the ultimate
decision to terminate her pregnancy").
16. 505 U.S. at 872 (plurality opinion).
17. Id. at 874 ("Only where state regulation imposes an undue burden on a woman's ability to
make this decision [to have an abortion] does the power of the State reach into the heart of the liberty
protected by the Due Process Clause."). Impliedly. state-enacted obstacles to the exercise of this right
are constitutional so long as they do not unduly burden the exercise of a woman's right to obtain an
abortion.
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nonviable fetus."' 8 Applying this undue burden test, the Gonzales Court
held that the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act" did not constitute an
undue burden on a woman's ability to procure a previability abortion 2 0
because "the type of abortion proscribed by the Act requires specific
regulation because it implicates additional ethical and moral concerns
that justify a special prohibition."' Notably, while the Court invalidated
one previability abortion procedure, other such procedures remain
legal. 2
The "balancing" prong has allowed the Court to pay lip service to
the fundamental right at issue, while simultaneously giving effect to the
moral concerns implicit in abortion regulation. Specifically, the Gonzales
decision gave credence to what Professor Sonia Suter terms the
"'repugnance' approach,"2  meaning that the Court recognized moral
repugnance not only as a valid State interest, but also as a State interest
sufficient to overcome a woman's exercise of her procreative liberty
interest in obtaining a particular type of previability abortion. This
decision seemingly contradicted the Court's previous representation that
morality would not control its decisions" and that "viability marks the
earliest point at which the State's interest in fetal life is constitutionally
adequate to justify a legislative ban on nontherapeutic abortions.""2 As it
now stands, the undue burden test represents an overly malleable
18. Id. at 877.
19. 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2oo6). In promulgating the Act, Congress found that "a partial-birth
abortion is never necessary to preserve the health of a woman, poses significant health risks to a
woman upon whom the procedure is performed and is outside the standard of medical care." Partial-
Birth Abortion Ban Act, Pub. L. No. io8-lo5, § 2(5), 117 Stat. 1201, 1202 (2003). Congress further
explained,
(K) Thus, by aborting a child in the manner that purposefully seeks to kill the child after
he or she has begun the process of birth, partial-birth abortion undermines the public's
perception of the appropriate role of a physician during the delivery process, and perverts a
process during which life is brought into the world, in order to destroy a partially-born child.
(L) The gruesome and inhumane nature of the partial-birth abortion procedure and its
disturbing similarity to the killing of a newborn infant promotes a complete disregard for
infant human life that can only be countered by a prohibition of the procedure.
Id. § 2(14)(K)-(L), 117 Stat. at 1205-06.
20. See Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 157-58.
21. Id. at 158.
22. See id. at 181-82 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing other procedures).
23. Sonia M. Suter, The "Repugnance" Lens of Gonzales v. Carhart and Other Theories of
Reproductive Rights: Evaluating Advanced Reproductive Technologies, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1514,
1519 (2oo8).
24. See Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 157-58 (discussing the State's interest in protecting society against
moral "coarsen[ing]"); see also infra note 27.
25. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992) ("Some of us as individuals
find abortion offensive to our most basic principles of morality, but that cannot control our decision.");
Roe v. Wade, 41o U.S. 113, Ii6 (1972) ("Our task, of course, is to resolve the issue by constitutional
measurement, free of emotion and of predilection.").
26. Casey, 505 U.S. at 86o (discussing Roe, 41o U.S. 113).
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balancing test, which can be manipulated by the Court to swing with the
pendulum of the majority's moral vision." It is not the second prong
balancing test itself that is offensive to the liberty interest at stake, it is
the jurisprudential shroud surrounding such a test and the resulting
ambiguity within the Court's decisions.
As the dawn of reproductive technological regulation approaches,
the Court must prepare to articulate a clear balancing standard that
accounts for both a woman's procreative liberty interest and the State's
interest in preserving and promoting potential life. This Note articulates
the problems with our current jurisprudence and proposes an alternate
framework for balancing individual and states' rights.
First, I argue that the precedential case law discussed in Part IV of
the Casey opinion allows for the construction of a broad procreative
liberty interest in accessing reproductive technological information from
both preimplantation and prenatal genetic tests. Second, as to the
balancing of the procreative liberty interest and the State's interests, I
propose the use of an analytical framework based upon Tom Beauchamp
and James Childress's four principles of bioethics.29 As with the current
balancing test, these four principles provide a means for the Court to
protect the liberty interest at stake, while acknowledging and promoting
governmental interests. However, my hope is that these four principles
27. See Suter, supra note 23, at 1519, 1580-83. Suter explains,
What Kennedy wants to legitimate as a justification for abortion regulations has more to do
with "moral concerns" and protecting the sensibilities of the community.
Kennedy fails to acknowledge he has introduced an entirely new justification for
prohibiting certain abortion procedures, one that Casey and Roe neither discussed nor
legitimized.
... Indeed, given the ultimately unpersuasive grounds for upholding an abortion ban
with no health exception, Gonzales suggests that such repugnance can be sufficient
justification for limiting abortion rights.
Id. at 1580-81, 1583 (footnote omitted).
28. Although preimplantation genetic screening provides information about in vitro embryos
while prenatal genetic testing provides information about in utero fetuses, I deal with these
technologies largely in the same manner. Selective discard of an embryo and selective abortion of a
fetus differ procedurally and ethically; however, they remain similar in terms of the ultimate decision
each involves. Both procedures implicate a parental choice of whether to have a particular child, and
both preimplantation genetic screening and prenatal genetic testing provide the information necessary
to make that decision. See Garrison, supra note 12, at 1639 ("[T]he regulatory issues posed by sex
selection are not unique to ART [assisted reproductive technology, such as preimplantation genetic
diagnosis]; regulation that restricts trait determination in ART thus should logically apply to the
abortion context as well. . . . [S]ex selection through abortion and sex selection through
[preimplantation genetic diagnosis] pose the same public concerns. . .. "). Thus, the broad procreative
liberty right discussed in this Note encompasses access to genetic information about both embryos and
fetuses.
29. See Tom L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMEs F. CHILDREss, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICs 12 (5th ed.
2001).
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will provide an objective language that the Court can use to articulate its
ethical concerns and to create a more transparent dialogue between the
liberty and State interests at issue.
The four principles are autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence, and
distributive justice.30 Consideration of these factors will allow the Court
to weigh the procreative liberty interest (autonomy) against the State's
interest in preserving potential life (nonmaleficence), and promoting
potential life (beneficence). In addition, the Court could consider the
burden posed by the inaccessibility of such procedures (distributive
justice). By weighing these four factors, I argue that the Court would be
more likely to find that the State's interests outweigh a liberty interest in
obtaining nontherapeutic genetic information-information about purely
cosmetic genetic characteristics. On the other hand, the proposed
balancing test would likely protect the liberty interest in obtaining
therapeutic genetic information about an embryo or fetus and its
potential medical health. Of course, it is important to recognize that
therapeutic and nontherapeutic genetic characteristics represent the
poles of a broader continuum of genetic characteristics which may
present more difficult questions for the Court.
. THE TECHNOLOGIES AT ISSUE
Before exploring the nature of the procreative liberty and State
interests at stake, I provide a brief synopsis of the reproductive
technologies at issue. In section A, I discuss preimplantation genetic
screening, which involves in vitro genetic testing of embryonic cells.
Section B explains prenatal genetic testing, a procedure used to test for
genetic characteristics of in utero fetuses.
A. PREIMPLANTATION GENETIC SCREENING
Preimplantation genetic screening evolved from a process known as
preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD), a procedure "developed to
identify and avoid specific disease-causing mutations before
pregnancy." 3' PGD involves the in vitro fertilization (IVF) process, by
which a woman's ovaries are stimulated and her eggs extracted.32 After
removal and fertilization of the eggs, a cell biopsy is performed, at which
time doctors analyze the genetic content of the embryo.33 Certain
embryos are then selected for transfer based upon these genetic tests.34
30. See id.
31. Susannah Baruch et al., Genetic Testing ofEmbryos: Practices and Perspectives of US In Vitro
Fertilization Clinics, 89 FERTILITY & STERILITY IO53, 3054 (2008).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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PGD allows women who have undergone IVF to screen the fertilized
embryos for genetic abnormalities, diseases, and chromosomal defects.35
In essence, PGD provides a means for IVF participants to avoid genetic
conditions like Tay-Sachs disease, cystic fibrosis, sickle cell anemia,
Huntington's disease, and others.36 Preimplantation genetic screening
involves the same technological procedures as PGD; however, rather
than focusing on diagnosis of genetic disease, preimplantation genetic
screening involves genetic testing for a broader spectrum of genetic
characteristics, including non-disease-related characteristics, and can
currently provide information about an array of traits, including sex,37
hair color,'8 eye color, skin color,40 height,4' and breast cancer
predisposition.42
Parents can utilize preimplantation genetic screening procedures in
various ways. First, parents may wish to use preimplantation genetic
screening to identify and select for a child who will have a particular
disability common to the parent,43 such as deafness" or dwarfism.45 Three
percent of IVF-preimplantation genetic screening clinics have used the
technology in this manner.46 Second, if the parents have an existing
seriously ill child, they may wish to select an embryo that presents as an
immunological match for their sick child.47 Twenty-four percent of IVF
35. See id.
36. GENETICS & PUs. POL'Y CTR., PREIMPLANTATION GENETIC DIAGNOSIS: A DiscussIoN OF
CHALLENGES, CONCERNS, AND PRELIMINARY POLICY OrrIoNs RELATED TO THE GENETIC TESTING OF
HUMAN EMBRYOS 3 (2004); Baruch et al., supra note 31, at 1054.
37. Finning & Chitty, supra note 2, at 69-70.
38. Branicki et al., supra note 3, at 164-65.
39. Id. at 164.
4o. Id. at 165-
41. Sovio et al., supra note 6, at 2.
42. Sagi et al., supra note 8, at 510-12.
43. For an interesting discussion of the creation of children with disabilities, see generally Kirsten
Rabe Smolensky, Creating Children with Disabilities: Parental Tort Liability for Preimplantation
Genetic Interventions, 6o HASTINGS L.J. 299 (2oo8). In response to Smolensky's piece, see I. Glenn
Cohen, Intentional Diminishment, the Non-Identity Problem, and Legal Liability, 6o Hastings L.J. 347
(2oo8). Accord Jaime King, Duty to the Unborn: A Response to Smolensky, 6o HASTINGS L.J. 377
(2oo8); Alicia R. Ouellette, Insult to Injury: A Disability-Sensitive Response to Smolensky's Call for
Parental Tort Liability for Preimplantation Genetic Interventions, 6o HASTINGS L.J. 397 (2008). For
Smolensky's rebuttal, see Kirsten Rabe Smolensky, Parental Tort Liability for Preimplantation Genetic
Interventions: Technological Harms, the Social Model of Disability, and Questions of Identity. 6o
HASTINGS L.J. 411 (2008).
44. A. Eliot Shearer et al., Mutations in the First MyTH4 Domain of MYO5A Are a Common
Cause of DFNB3 Hearing Loss, I19 LARYNGOSCOPE 727, 727-28 (2009).
45. See Michael J. Friez & Joseph AP Wilson, Letter, Novel FGFR3 Mutations in Exon 7 and
Implications for Expanded Screening of Achondroplasia and Hypochondroplasia: A Response to
Heuertz et al, 16 EuR. J. Hum. GENETICS 277, 277 (2008) (discussing mutations causing achondroplasia
and hypochondroplasia, types of dwarfism).
46. Baruch et al., supra note 31. at 1055.
47. Y ury Verlinsky et al.. Preimplantation Diagnosis for Fanconi Anemia Combined with HLA
Matching, 285 JAMA 3130, 3130-31 (2001).
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preimplantation genetic-screening clinics used the procedure for this
purpose." Finally, parents can use the results of preimplantation genetic
screening to select for cosmetic (nontherapeutic) genetic characteristics,
the most common of which is currently sex.49 Forty-two percent of IVF-
preimplantation genetic screening clinics have already used
preimplantation genetic screening to allow couples to choose the sex of
their baby.
Although the technology does not yet allow selection for a broad
array of nontherapeutic traits, with the advance of DNA microarray (a
testing device that can screen for thousands of gene variants at one time),
the ability to select such traits remains only a matter of time." The large
percentage of IVF-preimplantation genetic screening clinics that
currently permit nontherapeutic sex selection suggests that these clinics
might similarly permit parents to select for other nontherapeutic
characteristics once access to such genetic information becomes more
technologically feasible. Such feasibility raises concerns about selective
discard of genetically undesirable embryos.
B. PRENATAL GENETIC TESTING
Like preimplantation genetic screening, prenatal testing features
comparable technological capabilities, though testing is performed on an
in utero fetus rather than an in vitro embryo. Prenatal genetic testing
currently includes both first and second trimester screening and testing
procedures. Within the first trimester, women can obtain two procedures:
a chorionic villus sampling (CVS) or a first trimester screen. CVS
involves the removal of chorionic villi cells from the placenta through
transcervical or transabdominal sampling." Performed between ten to
thirteen weeks after the woman's last menstrual period, CVS detects
certain chromosomal abnormalities, like Down syndrome, and genetic
disorders, like cystic fibrosis.53 A new prenatal screen, known as the "first
trimester screen," involves a noninvasive blood sampling in combination
with an ultrasound evaluation of the fetus.54 Currently, this screen allows
mothers to identify the risk of certain chromosomal abnormalities, like
Down syndrome and Trisomy-i8." Both CVS and the first trimester
48. Baruch et al., supra note 31, at 1055.
49. Id. at lo56.
So. Id.
51. King, supra note 12, at 286.
52. American Pregnancy Association, Chorionic Villus Sampling, http://www.americanpregnancy.org/
prenataltesting/cvs.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2010).
53. Id.
54. American Pregnancy Association, First Trimester Screen, http://www.americanpregnancy.org
prenataltestingffirstscreen.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2030).
55. Id. Trisomy-r8 is a chromosomal disorder characterized by physical birth defects and medical
problems, which include, most notably, congenital heart defects. See SOFT: Nonprofit Volunteer
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screen detect potential risks for disease or chromosomal abnormality;
however, these technologies do not test for disease and chromosomal
aberration. 6 Likewise, in the second trimester, the quad screen and the
triple screen" detect risks similar to their first trimester counterparts.
If risk factors appear on these screens, women can then test for the
actual presence of a disease-causing gene or a chromosomal defect. The
most common tests are amniocentesis'" and cordocentesis." Just as PGD
technologies evolved into more expansive preimplantation genetic
screening technologies, prenatal testing could experience a similar
expansion and be used to test for nontherapeutic genetic characteristics.t
Amniocentesis can presently be used to determine fetal sex.6' Moreover,
a new first-trimester blood test would allow parents access to genetic
information at a much earlier stage of pregnancy.6 With parents able to
test for an array of genetic characteristics, reproductive technologies
effectively provide them with the information necessary to selectively
discard and abort genetically undesirable embryos and fetuses.
Organization for Children with Trisomy 13 and Trisomy 18, Trisomy 18 Facts, http://www.trisomy.org/
trisomyi8.php (last visited Mar. 17, 2010).
56. American Pregnancy Association, Chorionic Vius Sampling, supra note 52; American
Pregnancy Association, First Trimester Screen, supra note 54.
57. See American Pregnancy Association, Triple Screen Test, http://www.americanpregnancy.org/
prenataltesting (follow "Triple Screen Test: Multiple Marker Screen" and "Quad Screen" hyperlinks)
(last visited Mar. 17, 2olo) (defining the triple and quad screens as maternal blood screening tests that
look for potential neural tube defects, Trisomy 21, Trisomy 18, and other chromosomal
abnormalities).
58. American Pregnancy Association, Amniocentesis, http://www.americanpregnancy.org/
prenataltesting/amniocentesis.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2010) (explaining the examination of amniotic
fluid to detect neural tube defects, genetic disorders, and chromosomal abnormalities such as Down
syndrome).
59. American Pregnancy Association, Cordocentesis, http://www.americanpregnancy.org/
prenataltesting/cordocentesis.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2010) (explaining the examination of blood
from the fetus to detect malformation of the fetus, fetal infections, and fetal anemia).
6o. See, e.g., King, supra note 12, at 300 (discussing, within the context of preimplantation genetic
screening, the probability that improvements in understanding gene function will "provide information
on non-disease-related genetic traits, such as height, hair color, skin color, eye color, and possibly
some behavioral characteristics").
61. See Robin Elise Weiss, Finding out the Sex of Your Baby, http://www.childbirth.org/articles/
decide.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2010); see also American Pregnancy Association, Amniocentesis,
supra note 58.
62. H. Christina Fan et al., Noninvasive Diagnosis of Fetal Aneuploidy by Shotgun Sequencing
DNA from Maternal Blood, 105 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. Sc. 16266, 16266 (zooS). Already, an early
pregnancy (as early as the seventh week of pregnancy) blood test can be used to determine fetal sex.
Amy Norton, Blood Test Tells Fetal Sex in Early Pregnancy, REuTERS, Jan. 1S, 20Io, http:l//
www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE60H4CWzolooxll8 ("Determin[ingj fetal sex .. . has traditionally
meant invasive tests, like amniocentesis . .. )
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II. THE MOVEMENT TOWARD REGULATION OF REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGIES
As discussed in Part I, preimplantation genetic screening and
prenatal testing have the capacity to provide parents with a broad array
of nontherapeutic genetic information about an embryo or fetus. Thus,
these technologies implicate the parental decision of whether to have a
particular child, a decision which remains distinct from the broader
question of whether to have a child. Because of the ethical implications
of selective discard and abortion, scholars predict that some form of
legislation will emerge to harness the broad informational capabilities of
these technologies.6 For example, a recent study among IVF clinics
confirmed not only a need, but also a desire for regulation." Forty-three
percent of IVF clinics that performed preimplantation genetic screening
procedures reported receiving screening requests that they felt "raised
ethical questions."6 5 Furthermore, seventy-seven percent of clinics
believed that technological advances would permit screening of the
entire embryonic genome.66 As technology continues to offer greater
genetic information to parents, the potential need arises for regulatory
limits on the use of these technologies to furnish genetic information.
The need for regulation stems from ethical and societal implications
of allowing parents to choose-or not choose-a particular child based
upon that potential child's genetic characteristics. In a recent New York
Times article, Amy Harmon commented,
Abortion rights supporters ... have had to grapple with the reality
that the right to choose may well be used selectively to abort fetuses
deemed genetically undesirable. And many are finding that, while they
support a woman's right to have an abortion if she does not want to
have a baby, they are less comfortable when abortion is used by
women who don't want to have a particular baby. 8
In fact, only twenty-eight percent of Americans surveyed approved
of using preimplantation genetic screening to select a child's sex,
compared to sixty-eight percent who disapproved." Furthermore,
twenty-two percent approved of using preimplantation genetic screening
63. See, e.g., King, supra note 12, at 323 ("[Tlhe government no longer has the luxury of delaying
consideration of regulation and oversight..-..The development of [reproductive technologies] will
expand the demand for the procedure[s] and [their] use for controversial ends .... ); Michael J.
Malinowski, Choosing the Genetic Makeup of Children: Our Eugenics Past-Present, and Future?, 36
CONN. L. REv. 125, 204-05 (2003) (proposing regulation in order to avoid eugenics-like consequences
of a "carte blanche" procreative liberty right to use these technologies).
64. See Baruch et al., supra note 31, at 1o56.
65. Id.
66. Id. at o57.
67. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
68. Harmon, supra note r (emphasis added).
69. GENETICS & PUB. POL'Y CTR., PUBLIC AWAENESS AND ATrlTUDEs ABouT REPRODUCTIVE
GENETIC TECHNOLOGY 5 tbl.r (20o4).
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to select for desirable traits, while seventy-two percent disapproved of
this form of nontherapeutic genetic screening. However, in another poll,
seventy percent of Americans believed women should be able to obtain
an abortion if a strong possibility existed that the particular child would
possess some serious defect.7 Arthur Caplan, chairman of the
department of medical ethics at the University of Pennsylvania School of
Medicine, summarized the legal and ethical issues prenatal genetic
testing presents: "How much choice do you really want to give?, 7 All of
these difficult questions recognize the underlying truth that technology
will continue to evolve and that government regulation will likely be seen
as the answer to these problems.
From a broad viewpoint, regulation will likely attempt to limit some
forms of selective discard and abortion. Professor Suter hypothesizes that
as it becomes possible to test for traits other than just sex, states may
ban abortions on the basis of this information or perhaps restrict the
ability to get information about fetal traits. States might protect excess
embryos created through IVF by prohibiting [PGD] or the discard of
embryos with unwanted characteristics."
Sujatha Jesudason, associate director for the Center for Genetics and
Society, summarized the current concern about such legislation: "The
fear is that this [legislation] will be used as an excuse to limit women's
access to abortion .... But as these selective technologies are getting
popularized we need to try to agree on a set of principles without giving
up the fight for reproductive rights." 74
Because of the constitutional implications of controlling access to
reproductive services and information, the Court will likely be called
upon to perform a Fourteenth Amendment due process analysis by
balancing the procreative liberty interest in accessing reproductive
technological information and the State's interest in preserving and
promoting potential life. Any regulation that affects the accessibility of
these technological procedures might be "construed as an undue burden
on a woman's right to make procreative choices and challenged as
such.""
III. THE CURRENT STATE OF PROCREATIVE LIBERTY INTERESTS
Although reproductive technologies implicate concerns about
discard and abortion, some scholars have questioned "whether
reproductive rights encompass the right to any method of obtaining
70. Id.
7 1. Harmon, supra note i.
72. Id. (quoting Caplan).
73. Suter, supra note 23, at 1516-17 (footnote omitted).
74. Harmon, supra note i.
75. Malinowski, supra note 63, at 387 (quoting Jesudason).
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information that influences such decisions, and if so, whether it
encompasses the ri ht to any and all information, including information
about fetal traits."' Professor Suter summarizes, "If the state prohibits
prenatal tests for non-medical traits with the goal of preventing trait-
selective abortions, then the legitimacy of such state action depends on
the strength of one's procreative liberty interest in being able to undergo
such abortions." The Court's assessment of the procreative liberty
interest at stake is essential to its due process analysis. If the Court does
not recognize such an interest, regulation of reproductive technologies
will be treated as presumptively valid. However, if the Court recognizes a
liberty interest in undergoing a trait-selective abortion, then it will apply
a less deferential analysis in scrutinizing the state regulation at issue.
Thus, construction of the liberty interest represents the first prong of the
Court's due process analysis. In section A, I explore this first prong,
including the nature of the procreative liberty interest at stake and its
evolution through the Supreme Court's jurisprudence. I conclude that
women possess some fundamental procreative liberty interest in
accessing information made available by preimplantation genetic
screening and prenatal genetic testing.
Should it similarly find a procreative liberty interest in this
information, the Court would next perform the second prong of its
fundamental-rights analysis: the balancing of the liberty interest with the
State's interests in preservation and promotion of life. In section B, I
detail the changing nature of this second prong as well as the Court's use
of this prong to constrain the procreative liberty interest previously
recognized. I conclude that recent Supreme Court decisions undermine
the purpose of the current balancing test. In response, I propose a new
analytical framework that will provide a transparent language for the
Court to employ in articulating the competing concerns at issue.
A. THE FIRST PRONG: THE PROCREATIvE LIBERTY INTEREST AT STAKE
Although not always operating within the confines of the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, the Supreme Court has a
long history of recognizing the fundamentality and intimacy implicit in
decisions about procreation. Though decided under the guise of equal
protection analysis, Skinner v. Oklahoma represents the Court's first
treatment of procreation as a fundamental right.' In Skinner, the Court
invalidated a law which permitted the involuntary sterilization of certain
classes of convicts.79 In doing so, the Court emphasized that procreation
76. Suter, supra note 23, at x5i8.
77. Id. at '536 (emphasis added).
78. 316 U.S. 535, 54' (1942).
79. Id. at 536, 543.
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is "fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race."" In
Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court protected a married couple's right to
obtain and use contraceptives, reasoning that "allow[ing] the police to
search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the
use of contraceptives. . . is repulsive to the notions of privacy
surrounding the marriage relationship."" Seven years later, the Court
expanded upon the right enumerated in Griswold. In Eisenstadt v. Baird,
the Court powerfully suggested that "[i]f the right of privacy means
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free
from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentallY
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child." 2
Representing the pinnacle of the Court's broad expansion of this
fundamental right as to "whether to bear or beget a child," Roe v. Wade
recognized the ability to procure an abortion as a fundamental
procreative liberty interest.83
The Court reaffirmed Roe's essential holdings in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.t The Court once
again broadly construed the procreative liberty right, opining that
"[t]hese matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a
person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and
autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment."8' Although the Casey Court upheld an informed consent
requirement,86 a twenty-four hour waiting period," a parental notification
requirement, and a record-keeping and reporting requirement, it did
so under the second prong of fundamental rights analysis, discussed infra
8o. Id. at 541.
81. 381 U.S. 479,485-86 (1965).
82. 405 U.S. 438,453 (1972).
83. 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) ("This right of privacy.., is broad enough to encompass a woman's
decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.").
84. 505 U.S. 833, 845-46 (i992).
85. Id. at 851. The Court noted, "Neither the Bill of Rights nor the specific practices of States at
the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment marks the outer limits of the substantive
sphere of liberty which the Fourteenth Amendment protects." Id. at 848.
86. Id. at 883 (plurality opinion) ("[R]equiring that the woman be informed of the availability of
information relating to fetal development and the assistance available should she decide to carry the
pregnancy to full term is a reasonable measure to ensure an informed choice, one which might cause
the mother to choose childbirth over abortion.").
87. Id. at 886 ("Yet, as we have stated, under the undue burden standard a State is permitted to
enact persuasive measures which favor childbirth over abortion, even if those measures do not further
a health interest.").
88. Id. at 899 ("[A] State may require a minor seeking an abortion to obtain the consent of a
parent or guardian, provided that there is an adequate judicial bypass procedure.").
89. Id. at 900-01 (majority opinion) ("At most [these requirements] might increase the cost of
some abortions by a slight amount. While at some point increased cost could become a substantial
obstacle, there is no such showing on the record before us.").
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section B. As to the first prong, Casey recognized a broad, fundamental
procreative liberty interest in procuring an abortion.?
However, in Washington v. Glucksberg, the Court seemingly
abandoned the Casey conception of fundamental rights in favor of an
emphasis on liberties "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition."9' Focusing on the law's historical unwillingness to allow
physician-assisted suicide, the Glucksberg Court refused to recognize a
fundamental right to such a medical procedure." The Court reasoned
that "[b]y extending constitutional protection to an asserted right or
liberty interest, we, to a great extent, place the matter outside the arena
of public debate and legislative action. We must therefore 'exercise the
utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground in this
field'... ."93 The majority thus defined the potential liberty interest at
stake as the "right to commit suicide with another's assistance."94
Notably, the Court could have adopted a broader construction of the
liberty interest at stake and asked "whether there is a liberty interest in
determining the time and manner of one's death," as the Court of
Appeals did, rather than whether there is a liberty interest in committing
suicide with another's assistance." The adoption of the former
framework might have presented a historical perspective more conducive
to recognizing a liberty interest in physician-assisted suicide. In keeping
with his narrow construction of liberty interests, Chief Justice Rehnquist
announced that merely because "many of the rights and liberties
protected by the Due Process Clause sound in personal autonomy does
not warrant the sweeping conclusion that any and all important, intimate,
and personal decisions are so protected, and Casey did not suggest
otherwise."96
After the Glucksberg detour from a broad construction of liberty
interests, the Court in Stenberg v. Carhart once again affirmed the
fundamental procreative liberty interest recognized in Roe and Casey. In
Stenberg, the Court held unconstitutional a Nebraska statute that
90. Id. at 851; Suter, supra note 23, at 152-122 ("[I]n 1991, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey affirmed Roe's 'essential holding.' In so doing, Casey, even more than Roe,
emphasized the individualistic and self-defining aspects of reproductive autonomy...." (footnotes
omitted)).
91. 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997) (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503
(1977) (plurality opinion)).
92. Id. at 728 ("The history of the law's treatment of assisted suicide in this country has been and
continues to be one of the rejection of nearly all efforts to permit it. That being the case, our decisions
lead us to conclude that the asserted 'right' to assistance in committing suicide is not a fundamental
liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause.").
93. Id. at 720-21 (quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)).
94. Id. at 724.
95. Id. at 722 (quoting Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F. 3d 790, Soi (9th Cir. 1996)).
96. Id. at 727 28 (internal citation omitted); Suter, supra note 23, at 1541.
97. 53o U.S. 914, 92021 (2000).
March 2o1o] IolIi
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
prohibited previability partial-birth abortion without providing for a
health exception.98 Most recently, in Gonzales v. Carhart, the Court
upheld Congress's Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act, even though it
notably lacked a health exception." The Act completely outlawed a
previability, second-trimester abortion procedure known as intact
dilation and extraction, or partial-birth abortion, in which "the doctor
extracts the fetus in a way conducive to pulling out its entire body,
instead of ripping it apart."o Despite the Act's regulation of previability
procedures 0 ' and medical uncertainty about whether the Act posed
significant health risks to the mothers,' the Court found that it did not
constitute an undue burden on a woman's right to have an abortiono
Although "Gonzales broadens the range of state interests that can justify
limiting reproductive choices to include protecting community
sensibilities,"Io4 these State interests are dealt with in the second
balancing prong discussed infra in section B. In order to reach any
analysis of the State interest, Justice Kennedy had to recognize the
existence of a procreative liberty interest in abortion. Before discussing
the State interest in banning partial-birth abortion, Justice Kennedy
conceded that "a State 'may not prohibit any woman from making the
ultimate decision to terminate her pregnancy.'
As the above decisions evidence, the Court continues to recognize a
procreative liberty interest in certain areas of reproduction. However, as
discussed below, it has recently undermined this recognized liberty
interest through use of the second prong balancing of interests. The
question thus becomes whether the procreative liberty interest subsumes
reproductive technologies like preimplantation genetic screening and
prenatal genetic testing. If the Court adopts a narrow Glucksberg-like
"history and tradition" approach to the right to access such technological
information, any procreative liberty interest in reproductive technologies
would arguably cease to exist.'o Because reproductive technologies are
modern scientific inventions, a narrow historical approach would allow
the Court to quickly dismiss any claims that access to reproductive
98. Id. at 929-30.
99. 550 U.S. 124, 166-67 (2007).
Too. Id. at 137.
iol. Id. at 147.
102. Id. at 162; see also id. at 177 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("During the District Court trials,
'numerous' 'extraordinarily accomplished' and 'very experienced' medical experts explained that, in
certain circumstances and for certain women, [the banned abortion procedure] is safer than alternative
procedures and necessary to protect women's health.").
io3. Id. at 16o, 164 (majority opinion).
1o4. Suter, supra note 23, at i568.
ro5. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 146 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 50 U.S. 833, 879
(1992) (plurality opinion)).
To6. See Suter, supra note 23, at 1525.
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technological information has been a traditionally accepted liberty
interest."
However, the Court might avoid narrow construction of this interest
should it adopt a more general approach to the "history and tradition"
test. In his Glucksberg concurrence, Justice Souter emphasized the
importance of "living tradition," which envisions a more lenient
construction of "history and tradition."'o Arguably, the right to access
genetic information about an embryo or fetus could be more generally
described as the right to make an informed decision about whether or
not to have a child-in this case, a particular child. Professor John
Robertson asserts that "denying a person information about the package
of burdens, benefits, and rearing responsibilities that will ensue, or
denying her the ability to avoid or engage in reproduction based on that
information, would affect her decision whether to reproduce at all and
would interfere with her procreative liberty."' 9
In keeping with this assertion, I argue that reproductive
technological information falls within the sweep of procreative liberty
interests by a somewhat transitive property. Because these technologies
exist to provide greater information to parents about the benefits and
burdens of continuing a particular pregnancy, they necessarily implicate
parents' ability to make an informed decision about whether they can or
want to have a particular child. When construed as a decision about
discard or abortion, the decision whether or not to have a particular child
falls within the Supreme Court's abortion jurisprudence, which has
recognized a procreative liberty interest in procuring a previability
abortion."0 This transitive argument places access to reproductive
technological information squarely within the procreative liberty
interests recognized in Roe and Casey.
If the Court applies the Roe or Casey conception of the procreative
liberty interest, then the right to access these technologies would most
likely be protected as a fundamental right. The genetic information
provided by preimplantation genetic screening or prenatal genetic testing
may lead parents to make "intimate and personal choices""' about
whether to have a particular child. Thus, access to that information and
107. If the Court did adopt such an approach, petitioners challenging the constitutionality of these
regulations would be best served by argument detailing the lengthy history of the right to procure an
abortion. Justice Blackmun articulated such an argument in Roe v. Wade. See 410 U.S. 113, 129-41
(1973); see also, e.g., id. at 140 ("[Historically,] a woman enjoyed a substantially broader right to
terminate a pregnancy than she does in most States today.").
1o8. 521 U.S. 702, 765-66 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring) (citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542
(1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
T og. John A. Robertson, Genetic Selection of Offspring Characteristics. 76 B.U. L. REv. 421. 426-27
(1996).
Ixo. See infra Part IV.A (discussing the Court's recognition of a broad procreative liberty interest).
IIi. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 50 U.S. 833, 85i (1992).
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the resulting choice it entails become "central to the liberty protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment.""2 Assuming that the Court recognizes the
use of technologies as part of a broader procreative liberty right, the
right remains subject to further restriction under the second prong
balancing test, currently known as the undue burden test.
B. WEIGHING COMPETING INTERESTS: THE SECOND PRONG OF
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTs ANALYSIS
The second "balancing" prong accounts for government interests
and allows the Court to constrain an otherwise broad liberty interest. As
Professor Jack Balkin points out, the Roe decision contained multiple
holdings, not limited to the recognition of abortion as a fundamental
right."' The Court explicitly stated that "some. . . argue that the
woman's right is absolute and that she is entitled to terminate her
pregnancy at whatever time, in whatever way, and for whatever reason
she alone chooses. With this we do not agree."" 4 The Roe decision paid
homage to the strict scrutiny test, which first assesses whether a
fundamental interest is at stake, and upon such a finding, analyzes
whether State interests are sufficiently compelling to overcome that
interest. Roe recognized that the State possessed an interest in preserving
potential life from the moment of conception,"5 although that interest
could not become compelling before fetal viability, interpreted as being
after the second trimester." The Court also recognized that the State
interest in protecting the mother's health could not become compelling
until after the first trimester."'
In Casey, the Court seemed to discard the Roe strict scrutiny test in
favor of the undue burden test. The undue burden test prohibits
legislatures from placing "substantial obstacle[s] in the path of a woman
seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability.""' This test
eliminated the Roe trimester framework."' After Casey, legislatures
could regulate abortion to promote maternal or fetal health at all times
112. Id.
I13. Jack M. Balkin, How New Genetic Technologies Will Transform Roe v. Wade, 56 EMORY L.J.
843, 848 (2007); see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) ("We, therefore, conclude that the
right of personal privacy includes the abortion decision, but that this right is not unqualified and must
be considered against important state interests in regulation.").
114. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
i15. Id. at 162-63; Balkin, supra note 113, at 848-49.
II6. 410 U.S. at 163 ("With respect to the State's important and legitimate interest in potential life,
the 'compelling' point is at viability.").
I17. Id. at 163-64.
1u8. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992) (plurality opinion).
119. Id. at 875 ("Not all governmental intrusion is of necessity unwarranted; and that brings us to
the other basic flaw in the trimester framework: even in Roe's terms, in practice it undervalues the
State's interest in the potential life within the woman.").
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during pregnancy-not just after the first trimester-so long as such
regulation did not impose an undue burden to obtaining a previability
abortion.'2 0 In essence, the Court no longer required a State's interests to
become compelling but rather allowed state regulation from the outset
(so long as it did not impose an undue burden).'2 1 With the undue burden
test, the Court moved toward a standard of reasonableness, or an evenly
weighted balancing of liberty and State interests."' Of course, consistent
with Roe, after viability legislatures could completely ban abortion
procedures. 3 While the balancing nature of the undue burden test
possesses numerous advantages, it also provides the Court with a great
amount of discretion, "with no clear rules detailing its approach" to
balancing private and State interests.2
In its Gonzales decision, the Court seemingly weakened the undue
burden test through its deferential approach to congressional findings
and its consequent lack of consideration for the procreative liberty
interest at stake."' The Court upheld Congress's Partial-Birth Abortion
Ban Act, which notably lacked a health exception,2 6 despite medical
uncertainty about whether the absence of an exception posed significant
health risks to women.'27 In so holding, the Court reasoned that "[w]here
it has a rational basis to act, and it does not impose an undue burden, the
State may use its regulatory power to bar certain procedures and
substitute others.',12' Nowhere in this section of the opinion did the Court
reference its prior "viability" jurisprudence.
Applying a rational-basis-type deference,'2 9 the Court found that
"Congress could. . . conclude that the type of abortion proscribed by the
Act requires specific regulation because it implicates additional ethical
I2o. See id. at 869 ("The woman's liberty is not so unlimited, however, that from the outset the
State cannot show its concern for the life of the unborn, and at a later point in fetal development the
State's interest in life has sufficient force so that the right of the woman to terminate the pregnancy
can be restricted." (emphasis added)).
121. Garrison, supra note 12, at 1626.
122. David D. Meyer, The Paradox of Family Privacy, 53 VAND. L. REV. 527,538 (2000).
123. Casey, 505 U.S. at 870 (plurality opinion).
124. Note, Assessing the Viability of a Substantive Due Process Right to In Vitro Fertilization, 118
HARv. L. REV. 2792, 2808 (2005).
125. 550 U.S. £24, 163 (2007) ("The Court has given state and federal legislatures wide discretion
to pass legislation in areas where there is medical and scientific uncertainty."); see also Suter, supra
note 23, at 1568 ("[Tjhe Court [in Gonzales] weakens the undue burden test.").
126. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 166-67.
127. Id. at 164; see also id. at 177 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("During the District Court trials,
'numerous' 'extraordinarily accomplished' and 'very experienced' medical experts explained that, in
certain circumstances and for certain women, [the banned abortion procedure] is safer than alternative
procedures and necessary to protect women's health.").
128. Id. at 158 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
£29. In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg noted that "[i]nstead of the heightened scrutiny we have
previously applied, the Court determines that a 'rational' ground is enough to uphold the Act." Id. at
£87 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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and moral concerns that justify a special prohibition."'3 These moral
concerns included partial-birth abortion's alleged similarity to
infanticide,"' maternal regret after undergoing partial-birth abortion,'32
and protection of the medical field's integrity as well as society's
confidence in that field."' Professor Suter asserts that "Gonzales
broaden[ed] the range of state interests that can justify limiting
reproductive decisions to include the state interest in protecting society
and the medical profession against moral 'coarsen[ing]."'" In essence,
the Court utilized moral repugnance as a justification for completely
eliminating a previability abortion procedure. While other previability
procedures remain accessible, the decision's significance lies in the
Court's willingness to ignore, and thus overstep, previously erected
previability boundaries in order to completely ban intact dilation and
extraction. In addition, the Court employed deferential rational basis
review to effect its unprecedented minimization of the fundamental right
at issue."'
In many ways, the Gonzales decision collapsed the framework
constructed in Casey.36 As discussed in greater depth in Part IV.B, Casey
recognized a State's interest in promoting fetal life, an interest which
accrues at conception and remains subject only to the undue burden
standard until viability.' Hence, the Court upheld an informed consent
requirement, 3 8  a twenty-four hour waiting period,'39  a parental
notification requirement, 40 and a record keeping and reporting
requirement41 as regulations designed to promote life. Casey also
130. Id. at 158 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 159-60.
133. Id. at 16o.
134. Suter, supra note 23, at 1519 (second alteration in original) (quoting Gonzales. 550 U.S. at 157).
135. See Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 158.
136. See, e.g., id. at 171 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("It blurs the line, firmly drawn in Casey,
between previability and postviability abortions.").
137. See 505 U.S. 833, 872 (1992) (plurality opinion) ("Even in the earliest stages of pregnancy, the
State may enact rules and regulations designed to encourage her to know that there are philosophic
and social arguments of great weight that can be brought to bear in favor of continuing the pregnancy
to full term .... ).
138. Id. at 883 ("[R)equiring that the woman be informed of the availability of information relating
to fetal development and the assistance available should she decide to carry the pregnancy to full term
is a reasonable measure to ensure an informed choice, one which might cause the mother to choose
childbirth over abortion.").
139. Id. at 886 ("Yet, as we have stated, under the undue burden standard a State is permitted to
enact persuasive measures which favor childbirth over abortion, even if those measures do not further
a health interest.").
140. Id. at 899 ("[A] State may require a minor seeking an abortion to obtain the consent of a
parent or guardian, provided that there is an adequate judicial bypass procedure.").
141. Id. at 900-o3 (majority opinion) ("At most [these requirements] might increase the cost of
some abortions by a slight amount. while at some point increased cost could become a substantial
obstacle, there is no such showing on the record before us.").
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recognized that a State can move beyond mere promotion and can ban
abortion procedures post fetal viability:
The concept of viability... is the time at which there is a realistic
possibility of maintaining and nourishing a life outside the womb, so
that the independent existence of the second life can in reason and all
fairness be the object of state protection that now overrides the rights
of the woman."' 42
In essence, Casey articulated two State rights: (i) the pre-viability right to
promote life through nonburdensome regulation, and (2) the post-
viability right to ban abortion procedures entirely.
Thus, in banning a pre-viability abortion procedure, the Gonzales
Court overstepped Casey's viability boundary. Furthermore, the ban did
not further any State interest in preserving fetal life, as other previability,
second trimester procedures remained legally available. 43 The Gonzales
Court's willingness to ignore its own precedent raises the concern that
the Court might now be able to uphold bans on other previability
procedures -and under a rational-basis-type review nonetheless.
In her dissent in Gonzales, Justice Ginsburg reiterated this concern:
"Ultimately, the Court admits that 'moral concerns' are at work,
concerns that could yield prohibitions on any abortion.... One wonders
how long a line that saves no fetus from destruction will hold in face of
the Court's 'moral concerns.""" For example, although the Court deems
the intact dilation and extraction procedure particularly morally
repugnant, nonintact dilation and extraction by fetal dismemberment-a
procedure which is currently legal-seems no less gruesome. 45 Under the
Court's rationale, Congress could impose a similar ban on such a
procedure, citing moral concerns as its justification. In sum, after
Gonzales, the fundamental right test's second prong involves the
application of a deferential undue burden-or rational-basis-type-test
to all abortion regulations and bans, regardless of whether they affect
previability abortions. Furthermore, the Court has recognized moral
repugnance as a sufficiently compelling State interest to justify a
previability ban.
The inconsistencies between Casey and Gonzales raise questions
about the current state of the second prong of the test. Likely, the Roe
Court, and perhaps even the Casey Court, could not have conceived of
the specific medical advances that engendered the issues surrounding a
procedure like the intact dilation and extraction at issue in Gonzales.
However, reproductive technological procedures will continue to
142. Id. at 870 (plurality opinion).
'43. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 1 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("The law saves not a
single fetus from destruction, for it targets only a method of performing abortion.").
x44. Id. at 182, i86.
345. See id ati181-82.
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advance and raise difficult questions. Now is the time for the Court to
reconcile its conflicting jurisprudence and to define a clearer second
prong balancing test. In essence, when the Court is faced with these
difficult questions, it must be prepared to analyze the balance between
procreative liberty interests and State interests in such a way that gives
fair consideration to both sides. Suter suggests:
What Gonzales and Casey show us is that we do not yet have a
comfortable way of discussing liberty and social concerns in the context
of reproduction that allows us to recognize the pluralism of our society
and to protect individuals from oppression, while also recognizing the
way in which reproductive decisions affect society and others."46
Rather than eliminate a second prong balancing test altogether, the
Court should elucidate the factors it chooses to weigh. By making the
process more transparent, both the liberty interest and State interest will
be protected. Professor Michael Malinowski argues, "'Traditional
medical ethics.. . has relied on principles other than utility in
determining what is and is not ethically appropriate in the practice of
medicine in the research and therapeutic settings,' and such must be the
case with ART [assisted reproductive technology]." 4 7 In keeping with
Professor Malinowski's argument, I propose that the Supreme Court
move beyond its reliance on a veiled balancing test toward an open
acknowledgement of the importance of science and social perception in
determining the constitutionality of legislation that restricts procreative
liberty rights.
IV. TOWARD A NEW BALANCING TEST. INCORPORATING BIOETHICAL
PRINCIPLES
I begin this Part with a discussion of the four principles of
biomedical ethics discussed in Beauchamp and Childress's Principles of
Biomedical Ethics.'8 These principles include respect for autonomy,
nonmaleficence, beneficence, and distributive justice. 49 I propose that
courts use these principles as guideposts in the second prong balancing
146. Suter, supra note 23, at 1598.
147. Malinowski, supra note 63, at 204-05 (first alteration in original).
148. See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDREss, supra note 29. Dr. Tom Beauchamp is a professor of philosophy
at Georgetown University. He is also a senior research scholar at Georgetown's Kennedy Institute of
Ethics. He has published over one hundred scholarly articles and specializes in research on biomedical
ethics. See Tom L. Beauchamp, Georgetown Univ., General Profile, http://explore.georgetown.edul
people/beauchat/?PageTemplatelD=79 (last visited Mar. 17, 2olo). Dr. James Childress is the John
Allen Hollingsworth Professor of Ethics and a professor of medical education at the University of
Virginia. He also directs the Institute for Practical Ethics and Public Life. He has similarly published
numerous articles and books on the subject of biomedical ethics. See Home Page for James F.
Childress, Virginia Law, http://www.Iaw.virginia.edullawweb/faculty.nsflFHIPbl/h152928?OpenDocument&
ExpandSection=4 (last visited Mar. 17. 2010).
149. BEAUcHAMP & CHILDREss, supra note 29.
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test in order to eliminate current confusion surrounding the Court's
recent Gonzales decision and its effect on reproductive-rights
jurisprudence.
The interaction among these four principles reflects many of the
concerns that the Court has previously articulated, while providing a
more structured mechanism for weighing them. For example, though the
principle of autonomy appears quite broad, Beauchamp and Childress
argue that such a right cannot become "a practical guide to conduct"
until specification of the right and consequent valid exceptions to that
right evolve.' In essence, the authors suggest,
Respect for autonomy has only prima facie standing and can
sometimes be overridden by competing moral considerations.
Examples include the following: If our choices endanger the public
health, potentially harm others, or require a scarce resource for which
no funds are available, others can justifiably restrict our exercises of
autonomy.'
The remaining factors -nonmaleficence, beneficence, and
distributive justice -constitute these competing moral considerations,
which can override a prima facie deference to the autonomy, or
procreative liberty, interest. At some point, as the Court has previously
acknowledged, the State's moral interest in preserving life and promoting
maternal health ripens into a valid exception to honoring the
fundamental procreative liberty interest.' For example, the Court has
previously limited certain abortion-related reproductive choices to the
point at which a fetus becomes viable,'53 and, after Gonzales, to the point
at which moral outrage overwhelms the perceived fundamentality of the
right, even if that point occurs before viability.'54 Weighing Beauchamp
and Childress's four principles in the context of reproductive
technologies will help the Court identify the tipping point at which State
interests outweigh the liberty interest at issue.
A. RESPECT FOR AUTONOMY
As defined by Beauchamp and Childress, autonomy subsumes
"liberty rights, privacy, individual choice, freedom of the will,. . . [and]
being one's own person."' 55 The broad scope of this definition invites
comparison to the procreative liberty interests referenced in the
150. Id. at 64.
151. Id. at 65.
152. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 870 (1992) (plurality opinion);
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973)-
153. See Casey, 50 U.S. at 870 (plurality opinion).
154. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. I24, x56 (2007).
155. BEAUCHJAMP &0 CHILDEss, supra note 29, at 58.
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Supreme Court's fundamental rights precedents."6 Beauchamp and
Childress argue, "Respect for autonomy is not a mere ideal in health
care; it is a professional obligation. Autonomous choice is a right, not a
duty of patients."'5 7 The requirement that physicians secure a patient's
informed consent to a medical procedure represents a quintessential
example of the autonomy right."' Even outside of its procreative liberty
jurisprudence, the Court has recognized the importance of autonomy in
making substantial health decisions.'
For the purposes of evaluating the autonomy principle, I will treat
the procreative liberty interest as akin to such a principle. As I have
previously argued, the procreative liberty interest remains (somewhat)
intact.SO However, as reproductive technologies continue to advance,
such evolution will necessitate reexamination of the scope of-or at a
minimum, the definition of-the procreative liberty interest in the
context of these new technologies. In defining the autonomy interest, one
must remember that the interest can be subsequently constrained by
other bioethical factors within this balancing test; it need not be narrowly
construed from the outset. Thus, I propose that the autonomy right
broadly encompass a right to access the information provided by these
reproductive technologies. As Professor Robertson has asserted, the
denial of access to reproductive technological information equates to
denying her "information about the package of burdens, benefits, and
rearing responsibilities that will ensue, or denying her the ability to avoid
or engage in reproduction based on that information." 6 Denial of the
right to make an informed choice about discard or abortion constitutes
an infringement upon the procreative liberty interest."2 I nessence, this
right to information dictates that parents should be able to use these
technologies to garner information about a particular embryo or fetus.
With a broad autonomy interest in access to reproductive
technologies, the Court need not distinguish between therapeutic and
nontherapeutic technological uses at this level. Rather, the Court can use
the other second prong factors discussed below to differentiate between
these uses on a case-by-case basis. In essence, the extent of this broad
right to information must be balanced against the other limitations
156. See discussion supra Part III.A.
157. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 29, at 63.
158. Id. at 77-80.
159. For example, the Court has recognized an autonomy interest in refusing life-saving treatment.
See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990). Furthermore, the Court has
recognized that even an incompetent person can refuse such life-saving treatment upon a showing of
clear and convincing evidence that the person, while competent, expressed a wish to refuse such
treatment. Id. at 285.
x60. See discussion supra Part ILA.
16i. Robertson, supra note 1o9, at 426-27.
I162. See id.
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described below. Such an analysis preserves the fundamentality of this
procreative liberty interest, while giving weight to the State's interest in
preserving and promoting life.
B. NONMALEFICENCE
The principle of nonmaleficence encompasses the duty to do no
harm.'6' This duty remains "distinct from obligations to help others"'6 4
and thus "only requires intentionally refraining from actions that cause
harm."' 6' For example, the obligation to do no harm equates to the
State's abilit to protect viable fetal life by banning postviability abortion
procedures.,6 Although some overlap exists, the ability to completely
ban postviability abortions remains theoretically distinguishable from the
ability to promote previable life.' While a ban connotes a negative duty
to refrain from doing any harm, promotion of potential life implicates an
active State role in protecting, though not necessarily "saving," that life.
Furthermore, though it cannot ban abortion prior to viability, the State
can promote life from the moment of conception. 68 Thus, the Casey
Court found no undue burden in affirming a State's informed consent,'69
twenty-four hour waiting period,"' and parental notification
requirements."'
In the context of reproductive technologies, the State-and its
doctors-possess a duty to do no harm. Here, the harm arguably occurs
when parents access reproductive technological information and
consequently discard or abort a previable embryo or fetus based on that
information. Thus, "doing no harm" would likely involve attempts to
prevent such selective discard and abortion. While Casey held that the
State lacks the ability to ban abortion outright until the point of
163. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 29, at 113.
I64. Id. at 114.
165. Id. at 115.
166. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 86o (1992) ("[V]iability marks the
earliest point at which the State's interest in fetal life is constitutionally adequate to justify a legislative
ban on nontherapeutic abortions."); see also id. at 870 (plurality opinion), 879 (majority opinion).
However, the Gonzales decision has arguably eradicated some of these distinctions. See supra Part
IIl.B (discussing how the Gonzales decision altered the previability-postviability framework).
167. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 145 (2007) ("[T]he government has a legitimate
and substantial interest in preserving and promoting fetal life...."); see alo supra Part IlI.B
(discussing promotion of life and banning abortion). For further discussion of promotion, see infra
Part IV.C.
168. Casey, 505 U.S. at 869, 872 (plurality opinion) ("Even in the earliest stages of pregnancy, the
State may enact rules and regulations designed to encourage [the mother] to know that there are
philosophic and social arguments of great weight that can be brought to bear in favor of continuing the
pregnancy. .. )
169. Id. at 883.
17o. Id. at 886.
171. Id. at 899.
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viability,'72 the Court's decision in Gonzales suggests otherwise.'73 The
Gonzales Court upheld a ban on partial-birth abortion 74 based upon
"ethical and moral concerns that justif[ied] a special prohibition."'75 The
Court compared this new previability exception to the rule espoused in
Casey, which "confirm[ed] the State's interest in promoting respect for
human life at all stages in the pregnancy."'76 Justice Kennedy further
likened the informed consent law upheld in Casey to the Partial-Birth
Abortion Ban Act upheld in Gonzales.177 In doing so, Justice Kennedy
merged the State's interest in promoting life, which accrues at
conception, with the State's ability to ban abortion, which accrues only at
viability. However, a complete ban on an abortion procedure is not akin
to an informed consent requirement, which merely promotes life but
cannot prevent a mother from obtaining an abortion. A ban on a
particular procedure effectively prevents a woman from obtaining that
abortion procedure. In upholding Congress's previability ban on partial-
birth abortion, the Court crossed Casey's viability line, and, moreover, it
recognized moral repugnance as a sufficient State interest to justify such
a ban.
Returning to the subject of reproductive technologies, the State
arguably possesses a strong nonmaleficence interest in protecting
potential life from selective discard or abortion, even absent the State's
maximized moral interest espoused in Gonzales. Because these
reproductive technologies implicate a choice not to have this child (the
"harmful act"), rather than the choice simply not to have a child, the
State arguably possesses a heightened concern for protecting these lives
from such discrimination. This fundamental difference might justify
previability regulation with respect to reproductive technologies, so long
as the remaining factors also weighed in favor of such regulation.
C. BENEFICENCE
In many ways, beneficence overlaps with nonmaleficence, in that
beneficence principles include: "One ought to prevent evil or harm,"
"One ought to remove evil or harm," and "One ought to do or promote
good."' 8 In this Note, I focus on beneficence as the promotion of good,
or as a positive duty to do good, in order to maintain a separation
between nonmaleficence and beneficence. Examples of the rules of
172. Id. at 86o, 879 (majority opinion); id. at 870 (plurality opinion).
173. See 550 U.S. 124, 145 (2007) (sustaining the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act against
constitutional objections).
174. Id. at 136-37, i6.
175. Id. at i58.
176. Id. at 363.
'77. Id.
378. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDREss, supra note 29, at ii5-
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beneficence include "Protect and defend the rights of others" and
"Remove conditions that will cause harm to others."I79 Although these
bioethical principles represent a continuum of sorts, categorically
speaking, nonmaleficence subsumes the State's interest in protecting
embryonic and fetal life from selective discard and abortion, while
beneficence subsumes the State's interest in promoting maternal,
embryonic, and fetal life in light of any inherent risks in the technological
procedures. so Both the Casey'8' and Gonzales'8' decisions agree that the
State possesses an interest in promoting potential life and maternal
health from the point of conception. Thus, the beneficence principle
seems to weigh in favor of some state regulatory power. For example, in
the abortion context, the State can promote fetal life and maternal health
by implementing informed consent requirements, twenty-four hour
waiting periods, and parental notification laws.'
However, the State's beneficence interest is directly constrained by
two factors: (i) a cost-/risk-benefit analysis, and (2) the autonomy
principle. First, because most medically beneficent procedures entail
some risk to the patient, a doctor should only perform such procedures
when their benefits outweigh risks and costs.' 84 The Gonzales Court
arguably trampled upon the duty of beneficence in its refusal to require a
health exception to Congress's partial-birth abortion ban.'8' In her
dissent, Justice Ginsburg argued that "'numerous 'extraordinarily
accomplished' and 'very experienced' medical experts [had] explained
that, in certain circumstances and for certain women, intact [dilation and
extraction] is safer than alternative procedures and necessary to protect
women's health."' 86 The lack of a health exception effectively strips a
doctor of his or her ability to use the partial-birth abortion procedure
despite his or her estimation that the risks of another second trimester
abortion procedure outweigh the risks inherent in partial-birth abortion.
In this context, the lack of a health exception arguably interferes with the
duty of beneficence by preventing the doctor from performing the least-
risky second trimester abortion procedure.
Second, autonomy constrains beneficence so as to keep a patient's
rights in balance with her medical needs.'"' This constraint is epitomized
by a doctor's duty of beneficence to the embryo or fetus: the doctor's
179. Id. at 167.
18o. See discussion supra Part JV.B.
18I. See 505 U.S. 833, 872 (1992) (plurality opinion).
182. See 550 U.S. at 163.
183. See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
184. See Jaime Staples King & Benjamin W. Moulton, Rethinking Informed Consent: The Case for
Shared Medical Decision-Making, 32 AM. J.L. & MED. 429, 432, 436 (2006).
185. 550 U.S. at '64.
186. Id. at 877 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
187. King & Moulton, supra note 184, at 436.
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duty to promote the potential child's health must be balanced against the
patient's autonomous decision to discard embryos or abort a fetus.
In applying beneficence principles to the reproductive-technologies
context, I argue that the State has a duty to ensure that doctors, clinics,
and patients use reproductive technologies in responsible ways that
promote the "good" of the mother, potential life, and society. For
instance, restricting the types of nontherapeutic genes for which parents
can test may promote potential life and societal interest by
discouraging-though not prohibiting outright-discard or abortion
based upon nontherapeutic genetic traits. Furthermore, any potential
risks to the embryonic or fetal health from technological testing would
also weigh against using such technology, unless the information
provided from such a test greatly outweighed the risk presented by its
performance.
On the other hand, the State could arguably extend these
restrictions too far by preventing testing for certain therapeutic genes.
Promotion of maternal psychological health weighs in favor of allowing a
mother to know whether her embryo or fetus carries a certain disease or
disorder. Also, in some contexts, promotion of embryonic or fetal life
may encourage such therapeutic testing. If she should choose to carry
such a child to term, knowing about the potential child's disease or
disorder would allow her to prepare to care for that child and would
allow her to take medically necessary steps to maximize the potential
health of the embryo or fetus. Such knowledge allows a mother to weigh
the impact of the disease or disorder upon that potential child's life and
to decide whether to have a child whose limited years will be marked by
pain and suffering. In this manner, technologies could be used to
promote healthy mothers and healthy children.
D. DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
Lastly, the Court should consider the principle of distributive
justice. Beauchamp and Childress define distributive justice as "fair,
equitable, and appropriate distribution determined by justified norms
that structure the terms of social cooperation."'88 They note, "Problems
of distributive justice arise under conditions of scarcity and competition
to obtain goods or to avoid burdens."'' Within the reproductive
technologies context, distributive justice implicates two ideas. First, the
notion of distributive justice becomes somewhat parallel to Justice
O'Connor's undue burden test and may cut in favor of a procreative
liberty interest. Second, distributive justice problematizes the effects of
s88. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDREsS, supra note 29, at 226.
189. Id.
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unequal access to these technologies. Both of these ideas are discussed in
greater depth below.
Justice O'Connor defined an undue burden as "a state regulation
[that] has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the
path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus."" In
explaining why these substantial obstacles cannot exist, Justice O'Connor
resorted to equal protection language, arguing that
[t]he mother who carries a child to full term is subject to anxieties, to
physical constraints, to pain that only she must bear. That these
sacrifices have from the beginning of the human race been endured by
woman with a pride that ennobles her in the eyes of others and gives to
the infant a bond of love cannot alone be grounds for the State to insist
she make the sacrifice. Her suffering is too intimate and personal for
the State to insist, without more, upon its own vision of the woman's
role... '9
In essence, undue abortion regulation forces a woman to bear the unique
burden of pregnancy at her own expense.' In Gonzales, the dissenting
Justices based the right to abortion on "a woman's autonomy to
determine her life's course, and thus to enjoy equal citizenship stature."'9
The undue burden test recognizes that women's ability "to participate
equally in the economic and social life of the Nation has been facilitated
by their ability to control their reproductive lives."' 94 The notion of
distributive justice subsumes this emphasis on equality and unique
burden. Reproductive technologies afford women access to information
that allows them to make an informed decision about whether to bear
the burden and costs of becoming pregnant with a specific child or
continuing a specific pregnancy.
However, problems continue to surround such a decision.
Distributive justice weighs heavily in favor of allowing parents to
discover certain therapeutic traits of their potential child because caring
for children with certain diseases, disorders, or disabilities likely
constitutes a unique burden upon the parents, one that the state should
not necessarily force them to bear. Thus, with respect to therapeutic
traits, the balance likely tips in favor of honoring the procreative liberty
interest in accessing such information. If parents could access such
information, they could control what type of financial and psychological
burden they take on in having a particular child.
190. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992) (plurality opinion).
191. Id. at 852 (majority opinion).
£92. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) ("The detriment that the State would impose upon
the pregnant woman by denying this choice [to have an abortion] altogether is apparent. .. . Maternity,
or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a distressful life and future.").
193. 550 U.S. £24, 172 (20o7) (Ginsburg J., dissenting).
£94. Casey, 505 U.S. at 856.
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Nontherapeutic traits, in contrast, likely impose a minimal burden
upon parents. In this situation, the duties of nonmaleficence,
beneficence, and distributive justice align. First, as to nonmaleficence,
the State possesses an interest in protecting these potential lives from
superficial discrimination based on nontherapeutic traits. Moreover, as to
beneficence, the mother's health is less implicated by nontherapeutic
genetic testing and society's interest in preventing such discrimination
remains heightened. Lastly, as to distributive justice, nontherapeutic
traits arguably do not constitute any unique burden upon parents. Of
course, some genetic traits straddle the line between therapeutic and
nontherapeutic, in which case the individual burdens upon parents must
be assessed and weighed against the autonomy, nonmaleficence, and
beneficence interests.
Even though distributive justice, at times, may weigh in favor of
upholding the procreative liberty interest, as in the case of testing for
therapeutic genetic characteristics, these cases still raise concerns about
another aspect of distributive justice: access. Because reproductive
technologies remain somewhat cost prohibitive,'95 only a certain class of
women will have access to these technologies. When these technologies
are used to selectively discard or abort based upon any genetic trait, they
create a risk that society will become stratified among those who can
select against certain traits and those who cannot. Such social
stratification evokes concerns that society as a whole will become less
tolerant of those with certain genetic characteristics, particularly
disabilities and disorders. If parents use these technologies to avoid
disability-or to select for blue eyes and blonde hair-society faces the
risk not only of an uneven distribution of certain traits but also
discrimination against those with less desired traits. In essence, the
potential for discrimination raises concerns about a technological
eugenics movement." 6 When viewed in this light, distributive justice
weighs in favor of technological regulation.
E. APPLYING THE FOUR PRINCIPLES OF BIOETHICS
The principles of autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence, and
distributive justice provide a framework within which the Court can
weigh the procreative liberty interest in accessing reproductive
195. See, e.g., King, supra note 12, at 296-97 ("One cycle of IVF ranges in price from $io,ooo to
$12,000. While a handful of states require insurance companies to cover all or a portion of the costs
associated with IVF, a substantial percentage of IVF patients remain uncovered by insurance and are
forced to pay for the procedure out of pocket." (footnote omitted)).
196. See, e.g., Malinowski, supra note 63, at 13 1-33. "[T]here are compelling arguments that
support immediate infusion of comprehensive regulation into the field of ART [assisted reproductive
technologies]." Id. at 197. "[W]e have a moral obligation to reflect on our not-too-distant eugenics
past ... "Id. at 203.
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technological information against the State's interest in regulating these
technologies. In assessing the constitutionality of reproductive
technological regulation, these four factors would require the Court to
balance the procreative liberty interest in accessing such information; the
State interest in protecting potential life from discard or abortion; the
State interest in promoting maternal, embryonic, and fetal life; the undue
burden such regulation might place upon the liberty interest; and the
greater effects of such regulation upon society as a whole. Though
therapeutic and nontherapeutic characteristics represent two poles on a
genetic continuum, it seems likely that the balancing test would favor
regulation of traits readily identified as nontherapeutic, while allowing
greater leeway for the procreative liberty interest with regard to traits
that have clear therapeutic implications. However, regulation of traits
like the breast cancer gene and phenylketonuria present closer
questions."
For example, the Court would likely uphold regulation that
prevented parents from selecting for blue eyes and blonde hair." These
traits represent typical nontherapeutic traits. While the autonomy
interest exists in accessing information about these traits, even a broad
construction of an autonomy interest recognizes that certain decisions
are more fundamental to autonomy principles than others. The decision
to have a blue-eyed, blonde-haired child arguably presents a relatively
minimal autonomy interest; although concededly important to some
people, cosmetic appearance arguably should not be a weighty deciding
factor in deciding whether to bear a child.
On the other hand, the State's duties of nonmaleficence and
beneficence likely tip the balance in favor of regulation. The
nonmaleficence argument achieves maximum power in the context of
testing for nontherapeutic genetic characteristics. Though
nonmaleficence always weighs in favor of protecting life, such an interest
is heightened by the mere cosmetic purpose and lack of medical
significance behind nontherapeutic testing. A ban preventing selective
discard or abortion based upon cosmetic genetic characteristics only
minimally interferes with the liberty interest at stake. Furthermore,
beneficence weighs heavily in favor of regulation, as any inherent
embryonic or fetal risk in performing these tests likely outweighs the
test's informational value.
Lastly, carrying a child with certain nontherapeutic traits likely does
not constitute an undue burden upon a mother's ability to maintain equal
citizenship because the choice is whether to carry a particular child, not
whether to carry a child at all. In fact, a woman using these technologies
197. See Sagi et al., supra note 8; Guldberg et al., supra note 7.
198. See Branicki et al., supra note 3, at 164.
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implies that she wants to bear the burdens of pregnancy and to have a
child. In addition, other distributive justice concerns about a
technological eugenics movement, or the creation of a blue-eyed, blonde-
haired elitist class, also weigh in favor of regulating nontherapeutic trait
testing in order to preserve a diverse society. Thus, the Court could
potentially uphold regulation of clearly nontherapeutic genetic testing, as
nonmaleficence, beneficence, and distributive justice easily trump a de
minimis autonomy interest.
On the other hand, the Court would likely hold unconstitutional a
regulation that prevented parents from discarding or aborting an embryo
or fetus with Tay-Sachs disease.'9 9 This disease is always fatal and
currently no cure exists.'" As with the above hypothetical, the
procreative liberty interest in accessing this information exists. In this
context, the autonomy interest seems maximized, as decisions and
information about medical health remain at the heart of such an
interest. 20'
In opposition to this autonomy interest, the State maintains a strong
interest in protecting potential life from selective discrimination, as the
decision to discard or abort remains contingent on the fact that the
parents do not want this particular child. The beneficence factor can be
manipulated in favor of or against regulation in this context. If
promotion of embryonic and fetal life includes accounting for that
potential child's future health, then beneficence may honor a mother's
decision not to bear a child who will necessarily suffer and die within a
few years of birth. In this way, beneficence cuts against regulation,
although promotion of embryonic and fetal health is arguably limited to
prenatal development. It should also be noted that in this context, risk to
embryonic and fetal health from the actual testing is likely outweighed
by the importance of the genetic information provided. The State's
interest in promoting maternal health, psychological or otherwise, favors
allowing genetic testing for therapeutic characteristics.
Finally, distributive justice would suggest that regulation that
prevents testing for Tay-Sachs disease constitutes an undue burden upon
a woman by forcing her to undertake psychological, financial, and
temporal burdens to care for a terminally ill child.2 2 Some proponents of
199. Anne Marie Roe & Natasha Shur, From New Screens to Discovered Genes: The Successful
Past and Promising Present of Single Gene Disorders, 14 5C AM. J. MED. GENETICS 77, 78-81 (2007).
200. See Tay-Sachs Disease Information Page: National Institute of Neurological Disorders and
Stroke, http://www.ninds.nih.gov/disorders/taysachs/taysachs.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 20o).
29o. See supra Part IV.A (discussing autonomy).
202. For an interesting argument that women should not be forced to endure any of the burdens
associated with pregnancy, see Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense of Abortion. PmL. & Pus. AFF. 47,
48-49 (9979), arguing that the law should not force a woman to use her body to sustain the life of
another, just as people are not required to donate their organs to save the lives of others. Professor
Thomson also stressed:
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regulation may argue the other side of distributive justice: that
permitting selection against this disease will jeopardize research to find a
cure or social acceptance of certain diseases and disorders." However,
this somewhat obscure threat cannot likely upset the balance already in
favor of the procreative liberty interest.
Certain genetic characteristics, such as a predisposition to breast
cancer, straddle the line between therapeutic and nontherapeutic. These
traits present a more difficult regulatory question and thus underscore
the importance of balancing each factor in coming to a decision. A broad
construction of autonomy recognizes a procreative liberty interest in
accessing genetic information about a potential child. While the interest
is not de minimis, as with the case of purely cosmetic genetic
characteristics, it falls somewhat short of the maximal interest in the Tay-
Sachs disease example. BRCAi and BRCA2, the breast cancer genes, do
not dictate that carriers will develop breast cancer, but rather indicate a
predisposition.2 4 Because the information provided by these genes is not
determinative, it cannot trigger a maximized autonomy interest in the
way a determinative genetic medical diagnosis would. Against the
autonomy interest, the Court must weigh nonmaleficence, beneficence,
and distributive justice.
As with the examples above, the nonmaleficence viewpoint
emphasizes protection of embryonic and fetal life through restrictive
regulation, which provides something of a prior restraint on selective
discard and abortion based upon genetic characteristics. The need to
protect potential life in this context remains particularly high. Although
breast cancer has lethal potential, the presence of the BRCAI/2 genes is
not a death sentence, unlike in the Tay-Sachs disease context. A
potential child could live many years without breast cancer. Arguably,
this child could closely monitor her gynecological health in order to
proactively protect against breast cancer and could live a healthy, long
life. Thus, the State's interest in nonmaleficence supports technological
regulation of genetic information to prevent a general risk of selective
discard and abortion.
I am not arguing that people do not have a right to life-quite to the contrary, it seems to
me that the primary control we must place on the acceptability of an account of rights is that
it should turn out in that account to be a truth that all persons have a right to life. I am
arguing only that having a right to life does not guarantee having either a right to be given
the use of or a right to be allowed continued use of another person's body-even if one
needs it for life itself.
Id. at 56.
203. Cf King, supra note 43, at 393 ("[T]he creation of a regulatory agency that works with
representatives from the disability community to develop regulations for the use of reproductive
genetic testing could bring more light to their experiences, values, and concerns. .. )
204. Sag et al., supra note 8, at 508.
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Again, the duty of beneficence cuts in favor of both state regulation
and autonomy. In terms of promoting embryonic and fetal health,
beneficence suggests that regulation would be an appropriate means for
realizing this State interest. Unlike in the Tay-Sachs disease context, a
potential child who carries the BRCAI/2 genes could live a long, healthy
life. In essence, as with the cosmetic genetic characteristic example, there
is a potential and substantial life for the State to promote. Based upon
this information, promotion of embryonic and fetal health includes
protection from any inherent risks involved in the genetic testing.
Arguably, the information provided from such a test is not sufficiently
important to risk embryonic or fetal health. However, promotion of
maternal health may cut against regulation in this context. A mother may
carry immense psychological guilt or concern about bearing a child with
the potential to develop breast cancer. Because breast cancer is
becoming more treatable05 and because predisposition is not a diagnosis,
promotion of embryonic and fetal health likely trumps promotion of
maternal health. Thus, beneficence weighs in favor of some technological
regulation.
Lastly, distributive justice does little to discourage regulation in this
context. Because breast cancer normally occurs later in a woman's life,
presence of the BRCAI/2 genes in a potential child would not constitute
a unique financial burden to potential parents any more than regular
physician check-ups constitute a burden to parents of non-predisposed
children. Although the genes may present some psychological burden for
parents, the existence of effective treatments and preventative medicine
mitigates the burden. Because the presence of BRCA 1/2 does not
implicate a unique (financial) burden, a distributive justice rationale
cannot be used to bolster the autonomy argument in favor of no
regulatory control.
Furthermore, distributive justice can be used to promote such
regulation. If parents could effectively select against the BRCAI/2 genes,
a population without genetic susceptibility could be created. Some
people might fear that this stratification could discourage or quell the
search for a breast cancer cure. This argument is somewhat strained, as
breast cancer can develop even in the absence of a genetic
predisposition. However, the fact that breast cancer can develop in the
absence of genetic predisposition further supports the appropriateness of
regulation. Even when selecting against the BRCAI/2 genes, any
potential child will still remain somewhat susceptible to breast cancer.
Although the BRCAI/2 genes present a more difficult, searching
question, by using the four principles of bioethics, the Court would likely
205. See, e.g., BreastCancer.org, Breast Cancer Statistics, http://www.breastcancer.org/symptoms/
understand_bc/statistics.jsp (last visited Mar. 57, 20IO).
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uphold regulation of this technological genetic information.
Nonmaleficence, beneficence, and even distributive justice support
regulation and its attempt to preserve and promote fetal life. As
technology continues to evolve and difficult questions continue to arise,
these four factors can remain constants in the Court's analysis of
procreative liberty interests.
F. THE ADVANTAGES OF THE FOUR PRINCIPLES OVER THE CURRENT
BALANCING TEST
In applying a rational-basis-type review to the Partial-Birth
Abortion Ban Act, the Gonzales Court made an unprecedented
jurisprudential leap toward allowing broad moral concerns to trump the
fundamental right to obtain a previability abortion.2" The implication of
this decision is that the Court will defer to government assertions that
such regulations are not burdensome-in other words, that regulation of
medical procedures and technologies involving similar moral concerns
will be per se constitutional under the Gonzales balancing test." As
discussed above in Part III, the Gonzales Court's application of the
second-prong undue burden test presents stare decisis problems when
contrasted with the Court's prior procreative liberty jurisprudence.
However, the problems with the application of this second balancing
prong may run deeper than the four corners of the Gonzales decision.
I posit that the undue burden balancing test is inherently limited and
flawed by (i) its inability to adapt to the scientific evolution of new
medical procedures and technologies; and (2) its reliance upon an
amorphous, easily manipulable concept ("undue burden") as the heart of
its test. I argue that these limitations and flaws allowed the Gonzales
Court to reach a decision inconsistent with its precedent. By avoiding the
two enumerated problems above, the four principles of biomedical ethics
provide a more transparent language with which the Court can assess the
liberty and State interests at stake.
i. The "Adaptation" Flaw
Technology has made it possible to discern detailed information
about embryos and fetuses prior to implantation and viability.
Reproductive technologies may provide information critical to the
206. Compare Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 157 (2007) (discussing the State's interest in
protecting society against moral "coarsen[ing]"), with Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 850 (1992) ("Some of us as individuals find abortion offensive to our most basic principles of
morality, but that cannot control our decision."), and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 1i6 (1972) ("Our
task, of course, is to resolve the issue by constitutional measurement, free of emotion and of
predilection.").
207. Justice Ginsburg recognized the danger of a rational basis, morality-based test of
constitutionality. She worried that such a deferential balancing prong could effectively serve to uphold
any prohibition on abortion. See Gonzales, 55 U.S. at 182, 186-87 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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decision whether to discard or abort a particular embryo or fetus, as is
the case with detection of fatal genetic diseases. These technologies can
also be used to selectively discard and abort cosmetically undesirable
embryos and fetuses. Acting through the State, society may wish to
prohibit the use of these reproductive technologies to avoid "moral
dilemmas." However, under a strict reading of Casey's undue burden
test, any previability ban on the use of these technologies would arguably
be akin to an outright ban on abortion-and thus unconstitutional-by
preventing a mother from exercising her fundamental right to discard or
abort an embryo or fetus." Under the new Gonzales standard, the State
could seemingly ban all use of these technologies, citing to moral
concerns as justification for such regulations.' Neither result is
particularly desirable, and neither result accounts for the sensitive
balance between the liberty and State interests at issue.
As technologies evolve, ethical and moral questions become more
complex and difficult to answer. The Casey Court's use of previability as
a dividing line between constitutionally impermissible and permissible
regulation makes the test inherently hostile to strict regulations of (or
even bans on) new medical procedures and technologies which are
available pre-viability. The Gonzales decision was in large part a
backlash against such hostility. The undue burden test left the Court
without a means to uphold a ban against what it perceived as an
unnecessarily gruesome, pre-viability abortion procedure. By refusing to
honor the previability dividing line in its decision, the Court recognized
the need for a new test that transcended a largely obsolete temporal
demarcation.
The four principles of bioethics offer the advantage of adaptability.
The factors of autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence, and distributive
justice will remain relevant in the face of technological advances. For
example, applied to the partial-birth abortion ban at issue in Gonzales,
the bioethical principles would allow the Court to weigh the procreative
liberty interest (autonomy), and the burden the lack of a health
exception places upon a woman (distributive justice), against the State's
interest in preventing fetal harm (nonmaleficence), and promoting fetal
life (beneficence). Under such an analysis, the Court might have held the
ban unconstitutional for lacking a health exception.
2o8. See 505 U.S. at 878 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 869 ("The woman's liberty is not so
unlimited, however, that from the outset the State cannot show its concern for the life of the unborn,
and at a later point in fetal development the State's interest in life has suffici ent force so that the right of
the woman to terminate the pregnancy can be restricted." (emphasis added)).
209. See 550 U.S. at 163 ("The Court has given state and federal legislatures wide discretion to pass
legislation in areas where there is medical and scientific uncertainty.").
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2. The "Manipulable Test" Flaw
Another problem with the undue burden test is inherent in the
manipulable definition of "undue burden." For example, the Casey
Court suggested that an outright ban on a previability abortion
procedure would be an undue burden on the exercise of a woman's right
to obtain an abortion.1 o However, in Gonzales, the Court held that an
outright ban on a previability abortion procedure was not an undue
burden on the exercise of a woman's right to obtain an abortion.' The
four principles of biomedical ethics rely on concrete, clearly defined
terms, rather than an abstract legal standard. Moreover, because the area
of reproductive procedures and technologies is scientific by nature, the
four principles have the added advantage of using the language of
science to assess constitutional issues.2 2 In other words, the four
principles provide the Court with a functional language with which it can
discuss the legal issues inherent in the regulation of science.
CONCLUSION
As modern technology continues to evolve, the Supreme Court will
be faced with constitutional challenges to state regulation of
reproductive technologies. Technologies like preimplantation genetic
screening and prenatal genetic testing implicate issues of selective
embryo discard and abortion: both procedures implicate a parental
choice not to have a particular child, rather than a choice not to have a
child. In response, new regulations will likely attempt to control the use
of these technologies.
To assess the constitutionality of these regulations, the Court will
need a clear framework in which to analyze the nature of the right at
stake and the State's competing interests. The four bioethical principles
of autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence, and distributive justice
provide an appropriate guide to balancing the procreative liberty interest
in accessing such information with the State's and society's interests in
preserving and promoting life. In applying this test, the Court will likely
construe a flexible line between the continuum of therapeutic and
nontherapeutic traits such that states can regulate clearly discernable
nontherapeutic trait information. Moreover, these factors can evolve
along with technology and society, thus providing the Court with a
210. See 505 U.S. at 86o.
211. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
212. Professor Malinowski has emphasized the importance of viewing reproductive technologies
regulations through a scientific lens: "[T]he United States should enact legislation that creates
sufficient regulatory jurisdiction over this technology implemented by those with scientific expertise,
who should become directly engaged in ART through the dynamism of ongoing regulation reflective
of the changing nature of the underlying science and public opinion." Malinowski, supra note 63, at 216.
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consistent means of assessing the constitutionality of reproductive
technology regulations.
